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Book Reviews

The Army and Democracy: Military
Politics in Pakistan.
Aqil Shah. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014. 399 pages.
ISBN 9780674728936.
Reviewed by Mark F. Briskey
The army remains the foremost
power in Pakistan and Aqil Shah’s The
Army and Democracy: Military Politics in
Pakistan provides a well-researched
work on the origins of how the army
became the elite power institution
of the state, as well as provides
suggested remedies and predictions
as to the future role of the army in
this nuclear-armed nation.
Shah’s early chapters trace the
history of the Pakistan army and its
early forays into authoritarianism in
the first decades after independence,
while chapters five, six and seven
explain the role of institutional
beliefs and motives in shaping
the military’s behaviour during
subsequent moments of transition
from and to militarized rule in
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military governments. Shah then
goes onto to assess the increased
importance of new centres of power
such as the media and judiciary and
to assess their impact on how the
military exercises its de facto political
power and the prospect of real
democratic reforms in civil-military
relations in Pakistan. His research
methods include drawing evidence
from archival materials, internal
military documents, and over one
hundred interviews with Pakistani
army officers that included four
military service chiefs, three heads
of the Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISID), politicians, and
civil servants.
A central tenet of the book is that
it is important to investigate not
just how and why, but also when
the authoritarian seed was sown in
Pakistan. Shah’s primary argument
is that the military’s tutelary
beliefs and norms are a legacy of its
formative experiences attained under
conditions of geopolitical insecurity
and extensive nation-building
problems. These experiences, he
argues, profoundly shaped the army’s
political interventions and influence
by justifying its authoritarian role
and expansion into state and society
(p. 2). One of the key questions Shah
considers is, “Why did Pakistani
officers who shared a tradition of
apolitical professionalism with their
Indian counterparts break it so soon
after independence? And why did
they develop a political orientation
and supplant civilian authorities?”
(p. 34).

The army’s pivotal role, especially
in foreign policy and defence issues,
means that it retains a pivotal
importance in regional and global
security. Relations with neighbours
such as India and Afghanistan are
often difficult, if not characterised
by outright belligerence. Even
relations with allies are problematic.
For example, U.S. President Donald
Trump and Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson bluntly warned Pakistan
in August 2017 to rein in terrorists
suspected of being under the control
of the military-led Inter-Services
Intelligence directorate.
The interference of the military in
Pakistan civil society remains as
much an issue in 2018 as it did in
2014 when the book was published.
Some of the changes the author
hoped for in the book are somewhat
more evident, with the apparent
independence of the judiciary in
cases against high level political
corruption, such as the dismissal
of Nawaz Sharif from office due to
the Panama papers scandal in 2017.
Equally though, the influence of the
military is persistent and the Army
remains the de facto arbiter of power.
One prominent example is the army’s
vigorous suppression of independent
media that runs contrary to its
preferred narrative, as apparent in
the 2016 Cyril Almeida affair, though
even this is mild to some of the more
egregious accusations levelled against
the army.
While analysing the evolution of
the Pakistan military’s persistent
praetorianism, Shah does not wholly
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blame the army. He importantly
explains the tumultuous role of the
Pakistani political process since
1947 and the international political
environment in the evolution of the
Army’s authoritarian approach. Early
on, the army, thriving on its belief
that it was the only government
institution free of the miasma of
political corruption, considered itself
as the natural protector of the state
from what it saw as the ravenous
corruption of the politicians.
Similarly, the army successfully
perpetuated their raison d’être
and security narrative in their
successful establishment of India
as the hegemon unreconciled to an
independent Pakistan. India was
successfully cast as the existential
enemy, with Pakistani sovereignty
resting solely in the hands of the
army. Through the early dominance
of the army by Ayub Khan, as both
Chief of Army and Defence Minister,
the military foothold in civil
government has never been fully
relinquished either during direct
periods of rule or as the arbiter of
the ostensible periods of democratic
governance.
Shah’s objective in writing the
book was to address a gap in the
literature on the Pakistan army
and its persistent intervention in
politics. Shah argues that there
were deficits in previous arguments
that had not fully considered the
authoritarian attitudes of senior
army officers and their justifications
for the army installing itself as the
guardian of Pakistan. Shah rejects

the army’s interpretation of its role
as being culture specific and argues
that civilian control of democracy
is a universally accepted principal
of democracy. The arguments Shah
makes are important as Pakistan
has previously suffered a variety of
excuses from military governments
as to why the state was not ready
for democracy, which included
occasional support from highly
regarded Western academics. Shah’s
book is an informed critique of
military praetorianism.
An important strength of the book
is Shah’s wide-ranging access to
significant civil and military figures
involved in the events that he
describes. This infuses the book with
the insights and reasonings of the key
figures who he interviewed. In doing
this, Shah’s book builds upon the
corpus of work on the Pakistan army
and civil- military relations examined
to greater and lesser degrees by other
leading scholars on Pakistan such as
C. Christine Fair, Christophe Jaffrelot,
Ayesha Jalal, Hasan-Askari Rizvi,
Shuja Nawaz, Hein G. Kiessling, and a
number of others.
There could be some criticisms of
Shah for not delving too deeply into
the role of politicians and some of the
truly egregious examples of outright
banditry exacted on the nation by the
political elite. This is an issue worthy
of a thorough examination in its own
right, as Shah’s argument importantly
notes the how the pervasive cry of
corruption from the army was used
all too frequently to intervene or
usurp the democratic process.

This book is ideal for those who
wish to understand the evolution of
the Pakistani state over the course
of seventy years of a democracy
frustrated by a military convinced
of its predestined mission of
protecting the state from its
internal and external enemies. It
would be a useful addition to both
undergraduate and graduate students
with interests in Pakistan history,
civil-military relations, strategic
culture, praetorianism, and the idea
of garrison states. A book such as
this one would have been ideal upon
my first posting to Pakistan and in
this regard I would furthermore
recommend the book as a valuable
reference for diplomats, military,
and NGO officials being posted to
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India
to understand the provenance and
nuances of Pakistan’s domestic and
external outlook and the powerful
role that the army continues to
exercise in Pakistan.
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